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are: (1) the testator must have expressed substantially the same
bequest in a will executed immediately. next prior to his last will,
z.e. in the next to the last will made by him, and (2) the next to
the last will must have been executed at least six months before
2a
the testator's death.
Therefore, since the testatrix executed both her last will and the will
"immediately next prior to such last will"24 within six months of death,
the petitioner, who is a member of the class sought to be protected, may
take her intestate share at the expense of the charitable and scientific
beneficiaries.
The Supreme Court of Florida was forced to reach this decision because
the: statutory amendment was too narrow. If the purpose of the statute
is to protect certain heirs from hasty and improvident bequests to charity
by a testator who is in apprehension of impending death, it would appear
unreasonable that a testator who has displayed charitable inclinations in
a series of wills should not have his testamentary intentions honored. Therefore, it is submitted that the Florida Legislature might amend -this statute
to permit the courts to look beyond the will "immediately next prior to
such last will" 25 in order to give effect to charitable bequests.
HARRY M. ROSEN

CRIMINAL LAW-CONSPIRACY BETWEEN
AND WIFE

HUSBAND

A husband and wife were indicted for conspiring to defraud the United
States.' The federal district court dismissed the indictment on the ground
that husband and wife could not conspire within the meaning of Title 18
U.S.C. Section 371.2 The United States appealed directly to the Si preme
Court. Held, reversed: 3 the common law fiction of unity of husband and
23. In re Blankenship's Estate, supra note 20, at 468. (Emphasis not added.)

§ 731.19 (1959).
§ 731.19 (1959).
1. 18 U.S.C. § 545 (1958): "Whoever knowingly and willfully, with intent to
defraud the United States, smuggles, or clandestinely introduces into the United States
24.
25.

FLA. STAT.
FLA. STAT.

any merchandise which should have been invoiced, or makes out or passes, or attempts
to pass, through the customhouse any false, forged, or fraudulent invoice, or other
document or paper...
2. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1958): "If two or more persons conspire either to commit
any offense against the United States, or to defraud the United States . . . and one
or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall
be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both."
3. The dissenting Justices were Mr. Chief Justice Warren, Mr. Justice Black and
Mr. Justice Whittaker.
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wife is not applicable to prosecutions for conspiracy against the United States.
United States v. Dege, 364 U.S. 51 (1960).
At the common law the crime of conspiracy could not be committed
by less than two persons. 4 By application of the common law fiction of
unity of husband and wife,, it was held that spouses were incapable of
conspiring together.6 Prior to 1920, 7 this rule was mechanically followed by
all jurisdictions in the United States. 8 Despite judicial criticism, 9 some courts
held themselves bound by the unity fiction in cases of conspiracy until
such time as the fiction was abrogated by the legislature. 10 The fiction was
not applied to a husband and wife who conspired with a third party, even
if the identity of the third party was unknown at the time of the trial,"
2
or if the conspiracy occurred prior to a valid marriage between the parties.1
Although this rule was criticized by the courts,' 3 it was not expressly
repudiated until 192014 when the Supreme Court of Colorado, basing its
holding on the Married Women's Act, held that a husband and wife were
capable of conspiracy. 15 The common law fiction has been expressly

4. "A conspiracy is . . . a combination of two or more persons, by concerted
action, to accomplish a criminal or unlawful purpose, or some purpose not in itself
criminal or unlawful, by criminal or unlawful means .... ." Pettibone v. United States,
148 U.S. 197, 203 (1893); CLARK & MARSHALL, CRIMES § 9.01 at 496 (6th ed. 1958).
5. See cases collected in 41 C.J.S. Husband and Wife § 5 (1944).
6. Gros v. United States, 138 F.2d 261 (9th Cir. 1943); United States v. Shaddix,
43 F. Supp. 330 (S.D. Miss. 1942); State v. Clark, 14 Del. (9 Houst.) 536, 33 AtI.
310 (1891); Worthy v. Birk, 244 Ill. App. 574 (1922); Merrill v. Marshall, 113 Ill.

App. 447 (1904). See generally,

351 (6th ed. 1788); 1
§ 88 (12th ed. 1957); WINFIELD, THE

HAWKINS, PLEAS OF THE CROWN

WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
HISTORY OF CONSPIRACY
26 (1921).

§
7. Dalton v. People, 68 Colo. 44, 189 Pac. 37 (1920).

8. Gros v. United States, 138 F.2d 261 (9th Cir. 1943); United States v. Shaddix,
43 F. Supp. 330 (S.D. Miss. 1942); People v. Richards, 67 Cal. 412, 7 Pac. 828 (1885)
(dictum); People v. Little, 41 Cal. App. 2d 797, 107 P.2d 634 (Dist. Ct. 1940);
(dictum); People v. Eppstein, 108 Cal. App. 72, 290 Pac. 1054 (Dist. Ct. 1930)
dictum); State v. Clark, 14 Del. (9 Houst.) 536, 33 Atl. 310 (1891); Worthy v. Birk,
224 Ill. App. 574 (1922); Merrill v. Marshall, 113 I11.App. 447 (1904).
9. Smith v. State, 48 Tex. Crim. 233, 89 S.W. 817 (1905). The court stated
by way of dictum that the common law rule should be rejected, although there was no
need to apply the rule since a third party was involved in the conspiracy. Cf. Jones
v. Monson, 137 Wis. 478, 119 N.W. 179 (1909), where the plaintiff was allowed
to recover damages for the injuries sustained as a result of a conspiracy between
husband and wife.
•10. Dawson v. United States, 10 F.2d 106 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 271 U.S. 687
(1926); People v. Miller, 82 Cal. 107, 22 Pac. 934 (1889); State v. Struck, 44 N.J.
Super. 274, 129 A.2d 910 (Essex County Ct. 1957).
11. United States v. Anthony, 145 F. Supp. 323 (M.D. Pa. 1956); United
States v. Shaddix, 43 F. Supp. 330 (S.D. Miss. 1942) (dictum); People v. MacMullen,
134 Cal. App. 81, 24 P.2d 794 (Dist. Ct. 1933); State v. Clark, 14 Del. (9 Houst.)
536, 33 Aft. 310 (1891) (dictum); People v. Estep, 346 Ill. App. 132, 104 N.E.2d
563 (1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 970 (1953); Rex v. Locker, 5 Esp. 107, 170 Eng.
Rep. 754 (1803).
12. People v. Keller, 165 Cal. App. 2d 419, 332 P.2d 174 (Dist. Ct. App. 1958);
People v. Little, 41 Cal. App. 2d 797, 107 P.2d 634 (Dist. Ct. App. 1940).
13. See cases cited note 9 supra.
14. Dalton v. People, 68 Colo. 44, 189 Pac. 37 (1920). There was no need to
repudiate the rule in this case as the spouses had conspired with a third party.

15. Id. at 47, 189 Pac. at 38.
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rejected by two other state courts.' 0 The Fifth Circuit and the District
of Columbia Circuit have overruled the common law fiction of unity without
aid of statutory repeal, 17 while the Ninth Circuit has continued to apply it.18
The Supreme Court, in the instant case, was unwilling to perpetuate this
fiction merely because it had been followed since the eighteenth century. 19
The Court looked to the change in the social status of the "twentieth century
wife" 20 and realized that there was no longer any logic behind the fiction
that husband and wife were incapable of conspiracy.
The trend, allowing the conviction of spouses for conspiring together,
has been in accord with the law in other areas involving husband and wife.
The tendency of modern legislation has been to abrogate the common law
theoretical unity of husband and wife. All jurisdictions have enacted married
women's statutes or emancipation acts .21
It should be noted that a criminal conspiracy between husband and
wife presents the same degree of danger to society as would any other
unlawful combination. To shield the conspiring spouses from conviction
under the common law rule might increase the possibility of such offenses
being committed.
The dissent argued that the 1948 conspiracy statute was merely an
adoption of the original 1867 statute, 22 and as husband and wife were incapable of conspiring at the common law, in the absence of a specific repudiation by Congress, this well-established rule was included within the legislative
purpose of the 1867 statute. As the re-enacted statute must be interpreted
in the light of the original statute, 23 the dissent contended that the rule was
improperly repudiated by the Court, and that such action properly lies with
24
the Congress.
The dissent further argued, that for the "solidarity and confidential
relationship of marriage"2 5 to continue, there should be a preservation of
16. People v. Martin, 4 I11.2d 105, 122 N.E.2d 245 (1954); State v. Bayoukas,
226 Iowa 1385, 286 N.W. 458 (1939) (dictum); Marko v. State, 144 Tex. Crim. 509,
164 S.W.2d 690 (1942).
17. Wright v. United States, 243 F.2d 569 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 831
(1957); Kivette v. United States, 230 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 355 U.S.
935 (1958); Thompson v. United States, 227 F.2d 671 (5th Cir. 1955); Johnson v.
United States, 157 F.2d 209 (D.C. Cir. 1946): "No reason remains why the law should
not recognize the obvious fact that the relation of husband and wife does not prevent
two persons from conspiring to commit an offense." Accord, Ex parte Estep, 129 F. Supp.
557 (N.D. Tex. 1955).
18. Gros v. United States, 138 F.2d 261 (9th Cir. 1943); Dawson v. United
States, 10 F.2d 106. (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 271 U.S. 687 (1926). Accord, United
States v. Shaddix, 43 F. Supp. 330 (S.D. Miss. 1942).
19. United States v. Dege, 80 Sup. Ct. 1589 (1960).
20. Id. at 1591.
21. These statutes are collected in 3 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS §§ 167,
179 (1935).
22. United States v. Dege, 80 Sup. Ct. 1589, 1592 (1960) (dissenting opinion, Mr.
Chief Justice Warren).
23. Ibid.
24. Id. at 1593.
25. Id. at 1594.
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the unit. However, such confidential relationship between the spouses does
not offer sufficient excuse to exempt them from conviction if they are guilty
26
of the crime.
The Dege case resolves the conflict which had existed between the
circuits. It is submitted that the Court correctly took this opportunity to
overrule a doctrine "that has parrot-like been repeated ' 27 since the eighteenth
century. Whether the state courts will follow this rule remains to be seen.
MARVIN S. MALTZMAN

FEDERAL

PROCEDURE-JURISDICTION
BY STIPULATION

CONFERRED

The plaintiff, a citizen of Pennsylvania, brought a negligence action
against the defendant corporation, a citizen of New York, in a federal
district court in Pennsylvania. The defendant, by answer, challenged diversity
jurisdiction because it was also incorporated under the laws of Pennsylvania.
Subsequently, the parties stipulated to the jurisdiction of the court. After
twenty-three months, during which time extensive discovery and pre-trial
procedures were utilized and the statute of limitations had expired, the
defendant moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The motion was granted
and the plaintiff appealed. Held, reversed: the trial court abused its discretion
by re-examining jurisdictional facts previously stipulated to by the parties.
Di Frischia v. New York Cent. R.R., 279 F.2d 141 (3d Cir. 1960).
The great weight of authority holds that jurisdiction of a federal court
may not be conferred by agreement, consent or collusion of the parties.1
Diversity jurisdiction is a fact which must exist at the time the jurisdiction
of a federal court is invoked.2 If at any time jurisdiction is challenged, the
court is under a duty to proceed no further until the jurisdictional question

26. See Williams, The Legal Unity of Husband and Wife, 10 MODERN L. REV.

16 (1947).
27. United States v. Dege, 80 Sup. Ct. 1589, 1591 (1960).

1. United States v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 226 (1938); Mitchell v. Maurer, 293 U.S. 237
(1934); Ayers v. Watson, 113 U.S. 594 (1885); People's Bank v. Calhoun, 102 U.S.
256 (1880); Orth v. Transit Inv. Corp., 132 F.2d 938 (3d Cir. 1942); Page v. Wright,

116 F.2d 449 (7th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 710 (1941); 1 MOORE, FEDERAL
§ 0.60, at 608 (2d ed. 1960). "Diverse State citizenship of the parties, or some
other jurisdictional fact prescribed by the second section, is absolutely essential, and cannot
be waived, and the want of it will be error at any stage of the cause .....
Ayers
v. Watson, supra at 598.
2. McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178 (1936); Birmingham
Post Co. v. Brown, 217 F.2d 127 (5th Cir. 1954); Town of Lantana v. Hopper,
103 F.2d 118 (5th Cir. 1939).
PRACTICE

